a new wave of civilians became UXO vicrims. However, amendments to Namibia's
Arms and Ammun ition Act have seriously
curtailed rhe scrap business.

Demining Efforts in Namibia
Previous mine clearance programs in Namibia started the country on a
clear path towards demining success. Unfortunately, a current lack of funding
and a spillover of the longstanding conflict in Angola have thwarted progress.
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A woman injured
by an AP mine.
c/o NamPa/ Reports

by Whitney Tolliver, MAIC

Overview of the Situation
On May 14, 1998, during a ceremony marking the last minefield-clearing task in the Ohangwena region of
Namibia, General Jamerson, Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command described rhe country as
"a model for Africa and the wo rld. "' The
Namibian Defense Force (NDF) and
Namibia police deminers, trained and
s upported by the governments of
Namibia and rhe United States, successfully reduced the number of landmine
casualties during a three-year demining
program. The number of deaths due to
landmines and UXO fell from 10 in 1994
ro just one in 1997, a 90 percent reduction. The number of injuries dropped as
well, although nor as dramatically. At the
end of the General's speech he concluded,
"The decline in casualties means rhar the
citizens of rhe northern regions of Namibia
are safer now than they were before and

that human suffering
has declined." 1
Unfortunately,
s in ce that time, the
number of casualties
has once again increased,
especially In r h e
northern regions of the
country. At the end of
1999, Namibia became
subject to the terrors associated with the longstanding conflict occurring in the neighboring
state of Angola. T h e
Angolan National
Union for rhe Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) rebel movemen r crossed the border
into the north east regions ofthe country, laying new mineflelds
open ro innocent civilians. Thus, Namibia's
prior goal of becoming one of rhe first
countries in rhe world to successfully comply with the Ottawa Treaty received a major setback. As Colonel J.T. T heyse, Chief
Inspector of Explosives for rhe government of rhe Republ ic of Namibia stared
in a report, "Up to the end of 1999, the mine
problem in Namibia was finite and wellknown; it could be solved rapidly with
appropriated measures."' Now the government desperately needs renewed funding
in order to clean up these new areas before officials can once again declare Namibia
a model country on rhe road to success.

History
Before Namibia gained its independence from South Africa in March 1990,
the South African Defense Force (SADF)
m ined the northern regions of rhe country heavily. By rhe end of 1986, more than
352,000 square meters of minefields had
been placed around eight military and
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ing th e program whi le international
newspapers broadcasred the dire situation
the Namibian people faced.

US. Involvement

police bases, two water supply rowers and
the pylons on the Ruacana high-tens ion
power line. 2 Fortunately, in most cases,
the SADF properly marked, mapped and
fenced in these minefields. 1

Second Phase of Mine
Clearance
Ar the starr of rhe second phase of
mine clearance, local companies were
hired to conduc t rhe removal process.
Namibia Blasting Agents gained a contraer from South West African Water &
Ele ctrici ty Supply Corporation
(S WAWEK) to clear minefields surrounding the Ruacana power lines. T hey
used rhe same grid roller method as the
SADF to clear the berms left next to rhe
pylons. However, even after the final
sweeping phases of the fields, unexploded
landmi nes and UXO were found and
detonated by civilians and livestock.

First Phase of Mine
Clearance
With rhe impl ementation of United
Nations Resolution 435 in 1989, South
African troops conducted the first mine
clearance project in Namibia. The process they used involved driving heavy
barrie tanks pulling grid roll ers across
designated m inefields and bases ro clear
the areas. However, our of the 44,594
landm ines laid, only 40,779 were neutralized and 96 deton ated. Over 2,479
mines were left unaccounted for. 1 Therefore, the first demining project concluded
with only a 92 percent success rare. Even
with the first phase of mine clearance
completed, rhe country still had major
landmine probl ems.
After Namibia's independence from
South Africa and rhe SADF's withdrawal
in 1990, rhe number of casualties resulting from accidental detonations actually
increased. The destitute population rook
and removed fe nces marking the remaining mi nefields for their own personal use,
rhus allowi ng livestock and people to
freely roam highly dangerous mined areas. Specifically, small, unprotected
minefields were laid open around the
pylons on the Ruacana high-tension
power line. These fields contained 2530 plastic AP blast mines, and four to six
J .69 all-metal bounding fragmentation
mines. 1 As travel resumed in these areas,
vehicles and people also detonated old,
unmapped land mines placed along roadways and footpaths; rhe number of UXO
victims increased significantly as well.
After the war, hundreds of thousands
of pieces ofUXO were left behind in the
northern provinces along the border.
Many local civilians joined in the lucrative bur very dangerous business of colleering and removing them for Angolan
and Namibian scrap dealers. As a result,

Government Involvement
As rhe second phase of rhe demining
process was concluding, rhe Namibian
government assumed the responsibility of
all mine clearance and mine awareness
programs. On May 19, 1992, a Namibia
Cabinet resolution halted a second contraer for the clearance of minefields surro unding former military bases by
Namibia BlasringAgents. 1 The resolution
instead gave the NDF the expl icit orders
to clear all known minefields of AP mines
and AT mines, and told the Explosives
Unit of the Namibian police to remove
and destroy all mi litary ordnance and
UXO across the former war zone. Unfortunately, both the NDF and the Explosives
Unit lacked rhe suffic ient number of
clearance experts and equipment necessary to successfully complete rhe projects.
The Ministry of Home Affairs also
created rhe first Namibian Public Awareness Campaign during rhis rime. Their
goal was to inform the public of rhe dangers of handling UXO a nd how to mark
and report landmine and UXO findings
to the proper authorities. While rhe NDF
an d the Explosives Unit struggled to find
funding and demining expertise for their
projects, the public awareness campaign
received a great deal of national and international attention. National radio and
television services cooperated in launch-

...

U.S. arrenrion focused on Namibia
for two reasons. The first arose from the
failed demining missions. The United
Stares drew concern over the conti nued
detonations of AP mines in supposedly
"cleared" minefields. The seco nd generated from the effective public awareness
campaign. In response to their concerns,
the United Stares signed rhe Memorandum of Understanding with the government of rhe Republic of Namibia in
1995. As a result, the Demining Liaison
Committee was formed, and rhe U.S.
mil itary began training rh e NDF and
Namibian police deminers.
As the nvo governments worked together, minefields were cleared, fences
were taken down and land was finally
returned to rhe community. Towards rhe
end of the project, as General Jamerson
said during a final mine clearing ceremony in 1998, officials had great hopes
for Namibia. The country was almost
completely mine-free and rhe NDF and
the police Explosives Unit were properly
trained in landmine clearance. The official U.S.-spo nsored demining program
concluded on February 8, 2001, bur at
the rime of their withdrawal, rhe United
States donated more than $2 million
(U.S.) in earthmoving equipment, detection devices, computers and radio communication equipment ro the NDP

Current Status
Although demining efforrs increased
with U.S. involvement, rhe current number of casualties has recently risen in rhe
northern regions of Namibia, most notably the regions ofKavango and Capri vi.
In 1997, landmine casualties were li sted
as one killed and I 0 injured for the year.'
Bur during the following year, these numbers increased ro three killed and 22 injured and police reports from 2000 indicate
14 killed and 125 injured from landmines. 3
In addition to an increase in the
number of casualties, rhe types of incidents responsible for landmine civilian casualties have changed p ercentage-wise.
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From June 1989 to December 1999,
UXO accounted for 87.4 percent of all
landmine incidents, AP mines for 5.8 percent and AT mines for 6.7 percent. During the period of January 2000 ro January 2001, UXO percentages fell to 71.2
percent, wh ile AP and AT mines rose to
21.9 and 6.9 percent respectively.'
This increase is due to a spi llove r
from the long-running conflict between
Angolan UNlTA forces and Angolan
government forces- Forcas Armadas
Angolanas (FAA)-across rhe northern
border. In 1999, Namibia granted rhe
FAA the use ofNDF military bases along
the border for the purpose of defensive
attacks against UNITA forces in southeastern Angola.·l However, rhe FAA has
also used these bases for the stockpile and
transfer of ammunitions, and in irs 2001
report, the Landmine Monitor stared rhar
there have been allegations rhar these
ammunitions include AP and AT mines. 3

Conclusion
A major problem st ill exists in
Namibia. UXO and recently placed AP
mines from the Angolan con flict continue
to rake innocent lives. The NDF and
Explosives Unir lack the adequate personnel and budget necessary to eradicate the
problem. Mine awareness campaigns, although very effective, fail to reach rhe
remote corners of rhe country, the people
who need ir rhe most. Inconsistent maps
and minefield reports make 100 percent
accuracy of mine removal nearly impossible. The once seemingly simple lanclmine
problem in Namibia has again been complicated. The Namibian government needs
additional support to once again become
a "model to Africa and rhe world." •
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